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ABSTRACT 
  This paper aims at proposing a parsimonious methodology to evaluate the impact of 
large urban renewal projects on public revenues. The impact is largely endogenous, external to 
projects and may encompass a broad range of instruments, ranging from local to regional to cen-
tral governments. We look at licence fees, user charges, piggyback levies, excise taxes, social 
security contributions, and taxation of property, corporate income, personal income, and value 
added or sales. All these revenues are labelled tax dividends for short. The evaluation of a pro-
ject’s tax dividends may help governments on their licensing and, above all, on their co-
financing decisions. However, the need for rigorous financial evaluations faces too many diffi-
culties in practice, from modelling complexity to information shortages to time constraints to 
bureaucratic obstruction. The methodology in this paper will seek precisely at delivering feasi-
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  Economic performance within a city is not spatially homogeneous. Quite often, 
once prosperous districts lose the lead for new urban fronts and turn into economic 
blackspots decades later. These depressed areas typically raise a number of economic 
and social problems, like poverty, crime and pollution, which may also extend to 
neighbouring areas. Major renewal projects are development initiatives tailored to im-
prove the urban standards in blackspots. However, these programmes are likely to gen-
erate a number of positive externalities. Co-ordination problems may jeopardise their 
private provision. Even the government may fail to deliver the project if all relevant 
benefits are not internalised. 
  As representatives of the public interest, local and upper-tier governments have 
an obvious interest on major renewal projects and developers turn to them for licensing 
and financing purposes. At the same time, the public budget constraint is always a key 
political concern at every government level. A renewal project can be self financed, in 
which case there is no need for public funding. Yet, the licence decision may well take 
the public revenue impact into consideration, along with other economic and political 
effects. More interestingly, there may be renewal proposals with net social benefits, but 
where private benefits fall below private costs. In this case, the government’s willing-
ness to co-finance the project will certainly depend a lot on its public revenue impact. 
Thus, whatever the case, the assessment of the public revenue potential of a renewal 
project should appeal to public authorities. 
1.1   The analytical approach 
  Most revenue consequences will depend upon the project’s impact on the econ-
omy; hence, the economic analysis should precede the financial evaluation. In general, 
the economic effects differ across space and time. Spatial effects are not restricted to the 
renewal site. Very often, they spill over to neighbouring city areas, and may also in-
clude region and nationwide outcomes. Most in-site effects are internalised by the de-
veloper but generate tax dividends too. The renewal project can also bring important 
benefits to adjacent city areas, because it either reduces a negative externality—traffic 
congestion, pollution or crime, for example—or creates a positive externality—such as 
widely appraised amenities—for agents located therein. In the case of really large re-
newal projects, there may also be non-local effects to account for. In fact, the project’s 
own expenditure is likely to leak into regional and national suppliers, triggering macro-
economic consequences. Economic effects differ also on time, being permanent or tem-
porary. The former increase the real value of capital in the economy forever and thus   2
have a lasting impact upon output. Real estate rents, in site and in adjacent areas, capi-
talise the social net benefits of the renewal project. Temporary effects change the econ-
omy during a limited time span. Most of them come out of resource acquisition by the 
developer, and may include expenditure on planning, compulsory purchases, decon-
tamination, demolition, and construction. 
  We identify two mechanisms through which the projects affect the economy and 
thus public revenues: first, a permanent asset appreciation, usually restricted to an urban 
subspace; second, a temporary increase on expenditure. We propose to quantify the 
former mechanism by estimating differential rents; these, in turn, allow us to figure out 
the changes on the general government revenues. The expenditure mechanism triggers 
macroeconomic impacts and we propose using a tailored Mundell-Fleming approach 
combined with an adaptation of a cyclical budget balance framework that provides us 
with recent tax elasticity estimates. 
  The methodology is easily customisable to particular projects. As an example, 
we include an application to the large ongoing renewal project in Eastern Lisbon, Por-
tugal, triggered by the 1998 world exhibition—Expo’98. Frequently, major renewal pro-
jects are prompted by a highly visible event, such as this exhibition or the Olympics. 
The event itself is likely to cause temporary effects, for example through its impact on 
the tourism sector—which is likely to boost within the city and its region. Our applica-
tion shows also how to plug event effects into the analysis. 
1.2   Links to the literature 
  To the best of our knowledge, there is no available technique specially designed 
to suit the envisaged goal: assessment of the public revenue impact of a major urban 
renewal project. Yet, there are some methodological connections with the analytical 
tools which have been used in the literature to evaluate the economic effects of a large 
infrastructure programme. Among others, the list includes export-base approaches (Is-
serman, 1980; Norcliffe, 1983), input-output tables (Batey et al., 2000; Miller, 1998), 
shift-share analysis (Loveridge and Selting, 1998), macroeconometric frameworks 
(Bradley, 2000; Röger, 1996),
1 and applied dynamic general equilibrium models 
(Pereira and Gaspar, 1999; Pereira, 1997).
2 Richardson (1988) and Blakely (1989, Ch. 
5) remain useful introductions to these and other tools. O’Sullivan (2003, Ch. 6) and 
McCann (2001, Ch. 4) grant fresh surveys on the subject. Such tools can be effective to 
capture the effects of a large-scale investment programme on the regional or the na-
tional economy, by looking at the investment expenditure links with the rest of the 
economy.   3
  The export base and input-output models capture demand effects only and are 
popular in regional and interregional analysis. However, they are hardly tailorable for 
purposes of urban policy analysis. The export-base approach requires an ex ante defini-
tion of basic (or export) and non-basic sectors, which is not trivial in large, diversified 
cities. The computation of input-output tables requires data typically unavailable at the 
local level. The interest on shift-share techniques springs from their scarce data re-
quirements but is limited by the mechanistic economic explanations these techniques 
offer. 
  Demand and supply effects can be provided by macroeconometric and general 
equilibrium frameworks. Usually, they work out the infrastructure investment as an ex-
ternality to the production function and may untie short- and long-term economic out-
comes. However, the size of the renewal project may be too micro to endorse the use of 
these macroeconomic models. Also, their complexity commands data typically unavail-
able at the local level and a degree of expertise perhaps incompatible with the time and 
budget constraints of the commissioning agency. 
  In our view, a major renewal project fuels expenditure into the economy, as ex-
plained above. Thus, those tools can help to quantify the demand and supply effects of 
the project’s expenditure. However, a renewal project is much more than an expenditure 
engine. We believe there are other effects to consider as well: they spring from the 
value society attaches to the project achievements. Suppose the project provides the city 
with museums, a marina, top-quality zoning restrictions, streetscape improvements, 
broad road infrastructures, and a new subway line. The social value of these facilities 
does not need to coincide with their construction cost; in fact, and in principle, the two 
should be different. We argue that the project’s net benefits are transmitted to the econ-
omy through the differential willingness to pay for real estate assets in the renewal site 
and in neighbouring areas. The existing toolbox does not seem effective to cope with 
these other economic effects. Moreover, even their use to assess the impact of the pro-
ject’s expenditure may prove unfeasible in many actual exercises if their complexity 
renders the analysis too expensive or too long to accomplish. 
 
  The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 defines carefully the urban devel-
opment project our methodology applies to. A synopsis of the economic and tax effects 
of a major urban renewal project is presented in Section 3; they follow from the asset 
appreciation and temporary expenditure transmission mechanisms. Sections 4 and 5 
elaborate on the specific methodology to quantify the contribution of the former mecha-
nism upon the economy and the tax dividends, respectively. Section 6 details our pro-
posal to measure the economic and revenue effects triggered by the expenditure mecha-  4
nism. Finally, Section 7 exemplifies an application of the suggested framework—the 
Lisbon’s Expo’98 project. 
2.  A major urban renewal project 
  As a city grows, it experiences a slow but steady continuous shift in the patterns 
of land use, mainly due to the gradual suburbanisation of manufacturing activities, 
pulled out of the urban centre by cheaper land and better interurban road networks in the 
outskirts or pushed away by environmental protection zoning. At the same time, service 
activities move into the city centre and residential areas relocate within the urban area. 
These changes on land use patterns result in higher value added being generated at the 
urban centre and is likely to boost economic growth in its periphery as well. 
2.1 The role of major renewal projects 
  This gradual process of tertiarisation of the urban area does not evolve homoge-
neously across space. Sometimes, spots of inertia resist in or close to the city centre, re-
taining increasingly degraded industrial or residential activity. Such blackspots arise 
because of the strong negative externalities generated either by the industrial activities 
themselves or by the vicinity of inaesthetic or polluting collective facilities. 
  An example is provided by the concentration of four or five chemical plants in a 
4-km
2 land lot whose activity over several decades has contaminated the soils signifi-
cantly and continues to spoil the air daily. In this situation, if one firm decides to move 
away before the others, it will incur on decontamination and transfer costs, but it will 
not capitalise the potential value of the land, as buyers will continue to suffer the nega-
tive externalities imposed by the adjacent firms. Therefore, each firm has the incentive 
to be the last one to move away, so as to receive the full land value. Another example is 
a neighbourhood crossed or bordered by a linear transportation infrastructure—railway, 
highway or a canal. The revaluation of this zone implies the elimination or the covering 
up of the whole infrastructure, a project normally surpassing the capacity of local land-
owners. 
  So, sometimes the only feasible option to operate the complete regeneration of a 
depressed urban spot is the renewal of the whole area through a single requalification 
project. This is the major renewal project our paper addresses. 
2.2 Integrated regeneration policies 
  What are then the main features of the major renewal project we have in mind? 
First and foremost, the project must be an integrated package of land interventions   5
within the whole blackspot. The project needs to internalise most of the external effects 
above so as to circumvent the co-operation difficulties of individual landowners. The 
project is run by one special agent (the master developer) empowered to buy all land 
lots within the intervention area (IA), possibly through compulsory purchases. All land 
conversion operations, such as ground clearance and soil decontamination, are typically 
provided by the master developer. The developer is also responsible for the zoning pol-
icy in the IA, possibly with the co-operation of the local authorities, and guarantees the 
construction of a number of flagship collective facilities, such as cultural spaces, recrea-
tional zones, and accessibilities. The net proceeds from the resale of land lots, whose 
value will be capitalised by the project, should help the developer to finance the project, 
i.e. the land purchases, the conversion costs and the facility construction. 
  Second, and very often, the benefits from the renewal project extend well be-
yond the IA. In fact, real estate on neighbouring districts is depreciated because of its 
proximity to a depressed area. Hence, whilst the master developer is able to fully inter-
nalise the benefits in the IA, the same does not happen with the spillovers generated in 
the neighbourhood. These spillover gains can make a case for public co-funding, either 
by the local government and/or by upper-tier administrations. Calls for public financing 
can also arise simply because the works needed to renew the IA are only effective if 
their scale extends beyond the geographic boundaries of the IA; examples include wa-
ter-line cleaning, cover-up of highways and railways, and provision of new accessibili-
ties. 
  Third, the need to conclude the renewal intervention within a short period also 
pressures for an integrated operation. Note that the land lot resales are the major own 
revenue of the developer. The credibility of the project as perceived by market players 
influences substantially the land appreciation at the time those sales occur. There are 
indeed many cases where the speed of implementation is crucial for the success of the 
project. Consider, for example, an urban renewal project associated to the hosting of the 
Olympics or a Universal Exhibition. This event would certainly add a substantial visi-
bility to the renewal project, thus enhancing its marketing prospects; at the same time, 
the event would certainly impose strict deadlines to the project implementation and 
there would be serious credibility penalties for the developer in case of default. An inte-
grated management of most development interventions speeds up the project implemen-
tation. 
3.  The Economic and Fiscal Effects at Glance 
  A major urban renewal project impacts the economy via two channels: apprecia-
tion of real assets and expenditure on goods and services. Table 1 helps to sum up both   6
transmission mechanisms. We may realise the renewal project as a process through 
which the developer acquires a set of resources to transform into a set of results. Some 
results are tangible, and may include museums, marinas, recreational parks, exhibition 
centres, sports complexes, mass transport lines and road infrastructures. Intangible 
achievements may comprise the appreciation of the external image of the city, innova-
tive urban development features pioneered in the country by the major urban renewal 
project and the self-esteem derived from the achievement capacity of local and national 
residents. Generally speaking, the set of results impacts the economy via the benefits the 
society at large derives from its fruition. If society feels wealthier with such achieve-
ments, it will possibly produce and consume more goods and services in the future. The 
problem the applied analyst faces is how to measure such benefits. 
Table 1—Economic effects and possible tax dividends 
Effect Length  Recipient  government  Public  revenue 
Asset appreciation      
Local  Prop. Tax and others 
Permanent 
Central  I T  and others  Stock accumula-
tion and rent in-
crease in the IA  Temporary Local  Licences, Real-estate 
Sales Tax, and others 
Local  Prop. Tax and others 
Permanent 
Central  I T  and others 




tricts  Temporary 
Central  Cap. Gains on central 
govern. property 
Expenditure      
Master developer  Temporary Central  H T , T , T , and T   C I SS
Private developers  Temporary Central  H T , T , T , and T   C I SS
Tourists Temporary  Central  H T , T , T , and T   C I SS
  In our view, the bulk of benefits society enjoys from the tangible project 
achievements are capitalised into urban rents. In the IA, this capitalisation proceeds 
mainly from the creation of new real assets, and secondarily from the appreciation of 
existing real assets. The former include new buildings and the latter include land and 
preserved old constructions. As explained above, a successful project is also likely to 
spill over social benefits to adjacent districts: these benefits are signalled via higher 
rents on the existing stock. In both places, there are permanent and temporary effects to 
take care of. Real estate appreciations are permanent effects in the sense that they will 
remain embodied in market values forever. They accrue tax dividends to both govern-
ment tiers: the local authority benefits namely from higher property tax revenue whilst 
the central government gains from higher indirect tax (T ) proceeds, among others. 
However, the addition of new buildings and facilities provides the local government 
also with temporarily higher revenues: the proceeds from construction licences (occur-
ring during the construction phase only) and an eventual real-estate sales tax. Further-
more, some non-real-estate assets may appreciate as a consequence of the project. For 
I  7
example, take the case of taxi permits in a city whose renewal project brings in a sub-
stantial increase on the number of passengers.
3 It is also possible that government prop-
erty on neighbouring districts becomes more valuable as a consequence of the project. 
This enables the public owners to reap capital gain revenues once, which accounts for 
another kind of temporary local effect. The next section details this transmission 
mechanism. 
  The urban renewal project is expected to generate a different set of economic 
effects as well, with its own transmission mechanism. The project achievements require 
expenditure because resources must be used to produce those results. A fundamental 
expenditure source lies with the master developer: it buys multiple goods and services 
to transform the IA: land lots, multiple labour skills, cement, tar, transport vehicles, etc. 
The developer needs these goods and services to undertake land purchases, ground 
clearance and decontamination, land movements, business and household relocations 
and the construction of urban infrastructures, including flagship collective facilities, 
such as museums, multipurpose arenas and marinas. The construction costs on the IA of 
residential, office and commercial buildings, possibly by private developers, also adds 
to the aggregate expenditure on goods and services. If a flag event is associated to the 
renewal project, then the provision of specific goods and services to be used during the 
event (ticket offices, computers, national and international promotion initiatives, for in-
stance) also stimulates aggregate expenditure. Often, such events peak the tourism de-
mand in the city and other regions, again expanding aggregate expenditure. It is impor-
tant to note that these several expenditure inflows are temporary: they occur over a lim-
ited number of years, roughly encompassing the renewal project length. The temporary 
output expansion is likely to boost the base of the most important central government 
taxes: direct taxes on households ( H T ), direct taxes on companies (T ), indirect taxes 
(T ), and social security contributions ( ). 
C
I SS T
  Note that the two kinds of effects do not overlap. In general, the social benefits 
from the project achievements do not coincide with the provision costs detailed in the 
second transmission mechanism. To make the case clear, we can imagine a project that 
spends the whole budget on digging and subsequently closing big holes in the IA 
ground. The macroeconomic expenditure effects described above would still exist but, 
naturally, there would be no lasting results from such project and so no social benefits 
to enjoy in the future. 
   just makes explicit two administration tiers: local and central. However, 
for cases where a regional or state layer exists, the analyst should also take the respec-
tive tax dividends into consideration. Typically, regional tax dividends are a linear 
combination of central and local tax instruments. Finally, details may change from case 
Table 1  8
to case. For instance, in countries where regional and local governments charge indirect 
levies (e.g. retail sales taxation), asset appreciation may lead to higher permanent subna-
tional indirect tax revenues. See further details in Subsection 5.2. 
4.  Asset Appreciation Effects on the Economy 
  The major urban development intervention is likely to renew real estate property 
substantially in the IA. New buildings and collective facilities take the place of indus-
trial plants or deteriorated residential buildings. In principle, the property appreciation 
in the IA is easy to assess given the integrated business model of the master developer. 
The difference between the final value of capital goods (land, buildings and equip-
ments) in site and its initial value represents an increase on the stock of capital. Hence, 
the corresponding incremental rental value measures the permanent increase on poten-
tial gross domestic product (GDP). 
  From a macroeconomic perspective, the additional market value of property in 
the IA,  , increases the country’s stock of real wealth. In what follows, we assume 
that the marginal propensity to consume out of real wealth equals the adjusted real in-
terest rate, r; this is the ordinary real interest rate plus the economic-depreciation rate 
necessary to preserve the economic value of real estate forever. So, the perspective is 
consistent with future-oriented consumption theories with bequests: households smooth 
out their wealth consumption over time by spending every year just the real interest on 
their wealth, thus being able to bequest the principal to the next generation. Note that 
assuming a stronger wealth effect without a sound foundation for doing so would run 
against our conservative approach of avoiding to overestimate revenue impacts. 
IA dM
  A comparable macroeconomic effect happens with the asset appreciation in the 
adjacent districts. Here, the urban renewal project does not provide new real estate nec-
essarily but it impacts upon the market value of the existing stock, dM , where the su-
perscript stands for the locations adjacent to the IA. The annual increase on private con-
sumption is therefore rd . 
A
A M
4.1 Assessment of real estate appreciation 
  So, in order to quantify the impact of the urban renewal project on private con-
sumption, we need to assess the real estate appreciation in the IA and adjacent districts. 
At this stage, there is a difference to bear in mind between ex ante and ex post exercises. 
We say the assessment exercise is ex ante when it is performed before the results of the 
project are observable. Indeed, most programmes include a projection of impacts and 
public authorities may be very sensitive to tax dividend projections before deciding to   9
license or to co-fund the project. It is also common to find requests for ex post evalua-
tions, i.e. assessment exercises based on observed project outcomes. 
  In the former case, the applied analyst does not observe dM ,  iI . She thus 
needs to infer the expected market value appreciations. For property in the IA, there are 
normally professional property assessments available, both relating to existing (pre-
project) property and to future property. Given the integrated business model, the mas-
ter developer is self-interested on acquiring the most efficient price estimates and is 
aware of the construction potential. We assume the   value is available to the ana-
lyst. A more serious difficulty lies with the projection of  . Since most (if not all) 
asset appreciations in the adjacent districts are external to the project, there is no hands-
on figure to proceed to the next stage. The analyst must therefore focus on the additional 
rents on the existing stock, ideally breaking down the stock by classes: residential, of-
fice, commercial and industrial. 
i
A
, A A =
IA dM
dM
  One possible solution uses available databases on market values.
4 In many cities, 
professional agents collect actual rents or ownership values per sq. ft. and these data are 
organised by urban districts and property classes.
5 
 Naturally, the spillover effects of the 
renewal project tend to decrease as the distance to the IA increases. The definition of 
adjacent districts is a case-by-case decision requiring good wisdom to balance the avail-
able data zoning with the analyst’s perception of the spatial decay of spillovers. Once 
the adjacent area is identified, the analyst should look for a distant district (or collection 
of districts) with a property mix as close as possible to the one observed in the adjacent 
area. Let us denote such district as the benchmark district. The analyst needs to assume 
that there will be no project spillovers in the benchmark district. 
  One interesting feature of asset markets is their capacity of discounting future 
events with an impact on relevant prices. The more the urban renewal project is credi-
ble, the sooner the forward expectations about future prices are embodied on current 
prices. This seems to be a robust result in the case of projects with credible deadline 
commitments—which is typical of projects associated to flag events. It is perhaps ap-
propriate to distinguish across two kinds of ex ante assessments. First, consider an as-
sessment carried out after the credibility of the project is perceived by economic agents. 
As soon as the commitment to execute the project within the announced schedule is re-
alised by agents, market prices jump to a higher level and the following evaluation 
method becomes feasible. Let  t  be the year right before the project is announced and t  
be the latest year for which data are available. With no spillovers in the benchmark terri-
tory, its observed price growth rate between these two years,  ˆ
B p , can be used to pro-
duce counterfactual data for the adjacent districts. The counterfactual property price 
level in the adjacent districts at year t  is simply  ( ) ˆ + 1
AA B
tt qp p ≡ ; as the two zones   10
have approximately the same property features, we assume that the price level in A at 
time  t  would be 
A
t q  if there was no renewal project in the IA. Now, the difference at 




t p q − , is a proxy for the 
price appreciation due to the urban renewal project. The reliability of this method de-
pends on the expectation formation speed, as noted before. A second kind of ex ante 
assessment comes out when the exercise has to be carried out before the credibility is 
acquired. In this case, the observed period is probably too short for the market players to 
anticipate almost in full the asset appreciation due to the project, and the analyst may 
need to postulate additional assumptions about the adjustment pattern. 
  Naturally, the assessment of real estate appreciations turns out much easier in the 
case of ex post exercises. Here, the available price data, computed by professional spe-
cialists, reflects for sure the capitalisation of the spillover effects. The applied analyst 
can thus apply the above counterfactual methodology to estimate the appreciation as-
cribable to the urban renewal project. 
4.2 Agglomeration and other permanent effects 
  Besides the in-site and neighbourhoods effects just analysed, the achievements 
of the urban renewal project may engender other economic influences, spreading all 
over the city and contaminating the hinterland region as well. A more harmonious and 
cohesive urban centre boosts growth opportunities both in the city and in the region. To 
a large extent, these influences are capitalised into property values and Subsection 4.1 
has shown how to quantify them in the case of the IA and adjacent districts. Outside 
these local areas, the positive effects are smaller and inherently diffuse over space and 
so we recommend to ignore their quantification. 
  It could be argued that a local urban renewal could improve the general 
productivity in the economy but we do not give much credit to this possibility. In 
general, the activities attracted to the IA are not technological upstarts, they are likely to 
resemble ordinary urban activities, such as offices, housing, retail, culture and leisure. It 
is true that some collective facilities may have an impact upon the respective industry’s 
productivity—for instance, covered multi-use arenas for large events, theatres, 
exhibition pavilions or hotels. However, most of that impact is taken up by the facility 
itself and embodied into its value, thus being already accounted for in Subsection 4.1. 
  Finally, we should note a number of intangible results of the urban renewal pro-
ject. Successful large urban renewal projects may create marketable know-how to the 
master developer and other major actors and can also add self-esteem to the local and 
even national people. These results are hard to measure, and probably impossible to an-  11
ticipate in the case of ex ante assessment exercises. Though qualitatively interesting, we 
do not attempt to quantify them. 
5.  Tax Dividends from Asset Appreciation 
  The discussion in the previous section identifies one transmission mechanism of 
the project economic impact: the appreciation of real estate in the IA and adjacent dis-
tricts. This appreciation, in turn, affects the revenue of important taxes of all govern-
ment tiers. We start with the central government tax dividends. 
5.1 Central government tax dividends 
  Section 4 points at least to one major lasting effect of the urban renewal project 
on the economy: the expansion of private consumption. Private consumption is the larg-
est determinant of indirect taxes revenue, T , and so the wealth effect above triggers an 
increase on this revenue for sure. The next difficulty lies with the quantification of this 
causality. Typically, tax rates on goods and services are flat, causing the revenue elastic-
ity with respect to the base to equal the unity. The asset appreciation impact on the pro-






dT r dM dM
C
=+     
per year, where T  and C are the initial values of indirect taxes revenue and private con-
sumption, respectively. In reality, tax rates differ across goods and services. Actual elas-
ticities estimated from available time series may differ slightly from unity if households 
change their expenditure composition over the sample period. However, our analysis is 
a long-term one; as nothing in it supports a change on expenditure mix out of the wealth 
effect, we consider the above equation a reasonable approximation to the true tax divi-
dend. 
I
  The aggregate expenditure expansion triggered by the wealth effect is likely to 
stimulate output and the price level, possibly with different impacts over time. Hence, 
from a qualitative viewpoint, we cannot exclude the possibility of other central govern-
ment tax dividends: taxes whose bases are positively correlated with domestic income, 
such as personal and corporate income taxes and social security contributions, will 
probably generate more cash to the government in subsequent years as a consequence of 
the urban renewal project. Yet, as explained in the introductory section, our pragmatic 
proposal does not comprise a customised macroeconometric model with a sound price-
adjusting mechanism. In its absence, we cannot quantify these dynamic effects. Again,   12
we stick to the conservative option of minimising the chances of overestimated tax divi-
dends. 
5.2 Subnational tax dividends 
  A large urban renewal project is also likely to impact upon the revenues of sub-
national governments. We focus on local proceeds first. 
  Typical local government revenues include property taxation, excise taxes, pig-
gyback levies, user charges, and licence fees. Consider the (immovable) property taxa-
tion to begin with. As explained in Section 4, real estate rents are expected to increase 
permanently in the IA and adjacent districts and this information is essential though in-
sufficient to estimate the project’s dividend over this tax. Let   de-
note the present value of the future differential-rent stream corresponding to asset class 
k in the city. The number of classes to consider depends on the available information on 
real estate rents and may encompass broad classes such as housing, commercial, and 
industrial properties. So, dM  can be interpreted as the market-value appreciation of 
assets k due to the renewal project. Property tax revenues, T , are likely to follow each 
year. Yet, the link is not straightforward because the actual tax base most countries use 
differs from market valuation. Typically, tax administrations rely on property assess-
ments for this purpose and the nominal (statutory) tax rate, t , is a proportion of the as-
sessed value  , 
IA A




k A ≡ kk tTk A . Hence, given  , the revenue estimation involves, for each 
asset class, the estimation of the assessed-value appreciation: 
k t
  = kk dT t dAk
k
   . 
 At  most,  = dA  but this is unrealistic as most administrations are unable (or 
unwilling) to tax the full market value. In order to derive a finer estimation, we can ex-
press the actual tax base as a function of the market value, 
k dM
≡ kk Aa M k , where  —
normally smaller than unity—denotes the assessment ratio for asset class k. So, the ap-
plied analyst must inquire about the assessment ratio in use at the envisaged locations. 
Knowledge on the rules in practice will generally enable a reasonable assumption with 
respect to  . With this parameter, the urban renewal project effect on the property tax 
proceeds from asset class k can be finally estimated as 
k a
k a
  = kk k dT t a dMk    . 
  Local governments also have access to excise taxes. The actual bases differ a lot 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, sometimes even within the same country. These bases 
tend to target economic activities with local relevance, such as hotel turnover in tourist 
spots, casino revenues on gambling locations, or taxi rides in large cities. A large urban 
renewal project may or may not have a sizeable impact upon the revenue of these taxes.   13
It is up to the applied analyst to trade the benefits of accounting for this impact against 
the costs of performing the evaluation exercise. Given the fact that we are now discuss-
ing a narrow tax base, the exercise may be worthwhile when the project impacts directly 
on the base. For example, this is possibly the case of a project that includes a new gam-
bling complex in a jurisdiction with an excise tax on gambling, and has indeed been the 
case of the new Boston’s Convention & Exhibition Centre.
6 In many cases, the base es-
timates are easily available to the analyst because they are part of the project itself. 
  Piggyback levies are popular in many countries basically because they are an 
administratively simple method to make broad bases available to local governments. 
Examples of these bases include personal income, corporate income, retail sales and 
value added. The administration of these bases is complex and subject to substantial 
scale economies, which explain why their management tends to be a prerogative of cen-
tral governments. A piggyback levy allows each local government to share the base ap-
portioned within its jurisdiction. Let  i B  be the broad base eligible in jurisdiction i; the 
central government’s revenue raised within community i is W i w B i = , where w denotes 
the central government’s tax rate.
7 This jurisdiction’s piggyback levy is simply 
  ii Tt w B i =    , 
with   standing for the local tax rate. Therefore, in order to estimate the impact 
of the urban renewal project on the piggyback levy  , we simply have to assess the 
project’s effect upon the base 
0 1 i t ≤≤
i T
i B . Since the base is controlled and taxed by the central 
government, that effect should be scrutinised according to the relevant methodology we 
propose for central tax dividends.
8 The impact on this local tax follows straightfor-
wardly. 
  Many local authorities are also entitled to licence fees. A licence allows the ad-
dressee the right to perform a given activity, such as mobile phone operation or taxi rid-
ing. Some licences are sold while others are granted for free. Urban renewal projects 
may allow the government to derive money from licensing and, in general, the analyst 
has simply to look into the project to identify the licence fee potential. The idea is to 
search for impacts on the base of existing fees and to find also provisions for new li-
cence issues. As an example of the former, consider the construction volume induced by 
the project. Construction typically involves the temporary occupation of public space 
and many local governments only allow such occupation in return for a licence fee. The 
relevant dividend estimate is found by applying the predetermined fee structure to the 
projected construction volume. The Boston’s Convention and Exhibition Centre project 
provides an example of a new licence fee. The Centre costs were partially financed out 
of taxi medallion sales specially granted for the project’s purpose.   14
  User charges are one more local revenue category the applied analyst should 
look at. However, contrary to all other categories we have examined in this section, user 
charges are a form or earmarked finance. Governments collect them in return for a flow 
of goods or services (water supply, sewerage, solid waste disposal, etc.) they provide to 
local agents and therefore correspond to a commodity price. Ideally then, we should 
evaluate the urban renewal project’s impact on net revenue because, by definition, no 
user charges are collected without provision costs being incurred.
9 In an actual applica-
tion, it only makes sense to care about user charges if the project is likely to affect the 
provision of those goods or services. Typically, the project contains the relevant infor-
mation to figure out the empirical relevance of such effects. For example, the project 
may anticipate an increase on the number of households served by the piped-water in-
frastructure, broken down by income brackets. There are dedicated methodologies to 
estimate revenues and costs of network expansions and, if time and the budget allow, 
the evaluating team should go through one of these techniques.
10 Anyway, some crude 
indicators can be drawn by comparing the projected expansion to an existent bench-
marking district and this simpler procedure may be enough when the analysts are con-
vinced that the impact on (net) user charges is just a minor dividend. 
  Finally, grants are an important revenue source to local governments in many 
countries. They are basically monetary transfers from one government unit to another 
government unit, whether in the same jurisdictional level (horizontal transfers) or in dif-
ferent jurisdictional levels (vertical transfers). The accomplishment of the renewal pro-
ject may affect the size of future transfers to the jurisdiction where the project is being 
undertaken. For example, the betterment programme may attract additional residents to 
the local community, thus increasing future grants if they are proportional to resident 
population (as is often the case). Any way, as long as we want to evaluate the project’s 
impact upon the revenues of the general government, the potential influence of the re-
newal project on incoming transfers is uninteresting because it is fully cancelled out by 
a change on the outgoing transfers (expenditures) of another government unit. 
  One word of caution about potential spillover effects is worth mentioning. Some 
urban renewal projects may impact on the revenues of more than one local government. 
This is likely the case when the renewed district is close to jurisdictional borders. These 
interjurisdictional externalities are often a source of political conflict between adjacent 
communities when the project costs are concentrated in one jurisdiction and the benefits 
spread across multiple jurisdictions. This possibility may render the evaluation of local 
effects a very sensitive issue. The evaluation exercise should carefully disentangle the 
project’s impact upon the bases of the neighbouring jurisdictions and replicate the tech-
niques above to all parties involved.   15
  Last but not the least, we mention the case of regional or state governments. 
Generally speaking, their revenue portfolio is a combination of the central and local fi-
nance tools we have studied above. Hence, there is nothing specific to add. The applied 
analyst simply has to identify the regional or state revenues and apply the relevant 
evaluation methodology. 
6. Expenditure  effects 
  We now turn to the second transmission mechanism of the project’s economic 
effects. As noted in Table 1, the implementation of a large urban renewal project re-
quires expenditure by the master developer, and possibly by partial (private) developers 
and event tourists as well. Typically these expenditure flows are concentrated on a re-
stricted time horizon running up to the project conclusion and may change domestic 
output.
11 From a qualitative viewpoint, the project expenditure can be realised as an ex-
pansionary demand shock. 
  As is well known, demand shocks normally affect central government’s reve-
nues—and some expenditure items. The interest to identify business cycle effects on the 
public budget leads macroeconomic authorities to calculate cyclically-adjusted budget 
balances. The difference between the nominal, observed balance and the cyclically ad-
justed equivalent is a proxy for the cyclical budgetary effects. National governments 
and international organisations as the IMF, the OECD, the European Commission and 
the European Central Bank are currently very active on this area. 
  As the autonomous expenditure inflow ascribed to the urban renewal project is 
temporary, we suggest estimating the resulting central tax dividends as cyclical revenue 
components. For this purpose, we borrow on the growing theory and practice on cycli-
cal tax revenues. Here we will not look at the cyclical position of the economy but in-
stead at the temporary output change ascribed only to the renewal project. 
  We propose a two-step approach. Firstly, we estimate the macroeconomic effect 
of the (autonomous) expenditure increase, including the reactions on output, consump-
tion and other relevant variables. Secondly, we turn to tax elasticities (which measure 
the automatic reaction of public revenues to macroeconomic fluctuations) to determine 
the effect of those reactions on public revenues. The exposition follows with an expla-
nation of each step, beginning with the latter. 
6.1 Estimation of central tax dividends 
  The computation of the central tax dividends from the project expenditure makes 
use of tax elasticities. We build on the approach developed within the European Central   16
Bank, and presented on Bouthevillain et al. (2001) to obtain cyclically adjusted budget 
balances. This approach takes into account that different components of revenue react 
differently to output changes; instead of looking only at total output and its effect on 
total public revenue, the approach considers separately the main revenue categories. 
Broadly speaking, the cyclical component of a revenue category j is the revenue change 
induced by the cycle,  , and can be expressed as a proportion of the total observed 
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jj Tb  is the elasticity of revenue category T  with respect to the base   and   





  We adapt this methodology to evaluate the impact of the urban renewal project 
on public revenue categories. The idea is to define the proportional impact on revenue 
category j as simply the product of the relevant tax elasticity by the project’s induced 
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 Bouthevillain  et al. (2001) consider four broad revenue categories: direct taxes 
on households, direct taxes on companies, indirect taxes and social security contribu-
tions. They identify the appropriate macroeconomic bases for each of them and present 
values for the elasticity of each revenue category relative to the respective base for all 
EU countries—see their p. 18. The macroeconomic bases are as follows in Table 2. 
Table 2—Revenue categories and their bases 
Revenue Category  Macroeconomic Base 
Direct taxes on households  Employment and compensation of private sector employees 
Direct taxes on companies   Gross operating surplus  
Indirect taxes  Private consumption 
Social security contributions  Compensation of private sector employees 
  So, the four macroeconomic aggregates whose reaction to the project’s expendi-
ture shock we need to estimate are private consumption, gross operating surplus, com-
pensation of private sector employees and employment. 
  Our approach thus benefits from tax elasticity estimates available for national 
economies. The project recently led by the European Central Bank generated estimates 
of the relevant tax elasticities for all EU Member States.
12 These elasticities were “either 
econometrically estimated or derived from tax or expenditure rules” (Bouthevillain et   17
al., 2001, p. 7). For other economies it is possible to use the OECD estimates that were 
also recently revised—see the Appendix of van den Noord (2000).
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6.2 The macroeconomic effects of the urban renewal project expenditure 
  We now describe the first step of our methodology. The ultimate goal is the 
estimation of the project’s impact upon the tax bases above. 
  Consider the macroeconomic modelling to begin with. The nationwide macro-
economic effects are temporary: potential output does not react to the increase on 
planned expenditure. To keep our methodology simple and parsimonious we do not try 
to model dynamic transitory effects. Instead, we assume that an expenditure increase at 
year t changes output in the same year t and only in this year. Following this reasoning, 
that considers short-run effects only, we assume constant prices. Once again this is justi-
fied by the need to keep the methodology simple and parsimonious. Thus, we look at 
temporary effects on output springing from expenditure expansions while ignoring 
prices upshots. 
  Capital markets are so integrated nowadays that most urban renewal projects are 
too small to affect the interest rate. For a small open economy the interest rate is deter-
mined abroad. In the case of a large economy, the expenditure increase triggered by car-
rying out the renewal project is probably not large enough to change the interest rate. 
Thus, we take the interest rate as given. 
  Next, we assume a constant exchange rate. This is actually the case of many 
economies, including many countries pegging their currency to the dollar and also the 
Euro-zone economies. If we want to apply the methodology to a flexible exchange rate 
economy, it is necessary to assume that the expenditure shock caused by the renewal 
project is small enough to affect the equilibrium value of the exchange rate. This will 
not be an implausible hypothesis in large national economies. 
  Thus we propose to use a Mundell-Fleming approach. With exogenous ex-
change and interest rate, the output change caused by a variation on autonomous expen-
diture is given by the simple keynesian multiplier,  1( 1 ) α = −+ cm , where c is the es-
timated marginal propensity to consume out of total income and m the estimated mar-
ginal propensity to import. Having determined the total expenditure in goods and ser-
vices directly imputed in each year to the renewal project execution, we multiply these 
amounts by the keynesian multiplier to obtain the yearly estimated changes on total out-
put. 
  This is only an intermediate step as total output is not the ultimate macroeco-
nomic aggregate we are interested in. As explained above, our focus lies on the macro-  18
economic bases listed in Table 2 and their annual changes,  . The change on private 
consumption follows from the previously estimated consumption function. For the other 
three variables, we recommend the estimation of a relationship between them and total 
output, followed by the use of the parameter estimates to project the changes on these 
aggregates ascribable to the renewal project. 
j db
  At last, we can go back to equation (1) to compute the central tax dividends of 
the urban renewal project expenditure. We just have to plug in the annual estimated 




  The above methodology was applied to an ex-ante evaluation of the impact of 
the 1998 World Exhibition (Expo’98, for short) on public revenues—Baleiras et al. 
2002. The credibility of the project was already earned when the study was undertaken. 
The flag event was held in Lisbon, Portugal, in an originally degraded area bordering 
the Tagus river. The site, a long strip between the river and a major railway, was the 
largest industrial area inside the city, including an oil-refinery, a large slaughterhouse, 
waste dump and treatment facilities, along with military and port warehouses. The re-
finery was obsolete, the port facilities were unusable and in general the equipments 
were degraded. The renewal operation, managed by a public-funded firm (Parque Expo 
98, or PE), was linked to the Exhibition, implying the clearing and full treatment of soil 
prior to the event. Lisbon zoning restrictions were changed in order to reconvert the site 
for homes, offices and entertainment facilities. A (central) government decree defined 
clearly the geographical limits of the IA, granted public interest to it, and assigned PE 
with urban planning authority over the entire IA. The neighbourhood of the IA could be 
easily defined by us given the topology of the area. All figures quoted below are ex-
pressed at 2001 constant prices, unless otherwise noticed. Tax dividends are expressed 
as 2001 present values, using a 2.5 per cent discount rate. 
 Regarding  asset appreciation effects, we considered three areas of local impact: 
(a) the IA, (b) nearby consolidated residential districts, and (c) nearby restructuring dis-
tricts. In the IA, we used financial data from the master developer; disregarding its net 
profits, we considered (a present) value of 374.8 million euros (€374.8m) of local 
taxes—including some temporary licence revenue. In the adjacent consolidated residen-
tial districts, we searched for a benchmark, another Lisbon district with similar charac-
teristics but not suffering the negative external effects.
14 Then we applied the bench-
mark price growth rate to those districts, obtaining a €369.77 differential per square me-
tre and a corresponding property appreciation of €737m, generating €296.0m local   19
property taxes, plus a wealth effect on central indirect taxes of €165.8m. In the adjacent 
restructuring districts, we analysed the (probable) changes in the zoning restrictions and 
computed the expected future built-up areas for residential, office and industrial uses, 
obtaining a real estate appreciation of €1,213.0m, generating €485.2m on local property 
taxes, indirect taxes of €272.9m, plus large (but not quantified) capital gains on gov-
ernment property. These additional tax revenuesmost of them permanent effects, 
some temporary (licences)amounted globally to €1,594.7m. 
  We now focus on expenditure effects. We estimated linear functions for con-
sumption and imports using time series for the previous business cycle of the Portu-
guese economy (1985-1995), obtaining a value of 0.8 for the marginal propensity to 
consume, c, and a value of 0.682 for the marginal propensity to import, m, thus imply-
ing a keynesian multiplier  . () 1/ 1 1.134 α =− + ≅ cm
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  We had access to the master developer’s expenditure on the Expo’98 project, 
between 1993 and 2001, as certified by the national Court of Auditors. Table 3 presents 
the expenditure value and the respective effect on output, as determined by the multi-
plier:  α =× dGDP d A. The autonomous expenditure increase, dA, corresponds to the 
expenditure of the project—the leftmost column. We present values for the proportional 
change on GDP, as we need them to apply the tax elasticities in equation (1); at the 
same time, these figures show the dimension of the project at a nationwide level. 
Table 3—Master developer's expenditure and GDP impact 
  Million euros, current prices 
  Expenditure dGDP dGDP/GDP
1993  29.62 33.59 0.05% 
1994  208.76 236.68 0.32% 
1995  195.89 222.10 0.29% 
1996  320.98 363.92 0.44% 
1997  501.54 568.64 0.64% 
1998  802.05 909.34 0.89% 
1999  255.72 289.93 0.27% 
2000  137.83 156.27 0.14% 
2001  113.34 128.50 0.10% 
  As mentioned in footnote 12, we used the tax elasticities computed by Neves 
and Sarmento (2001) for the Portuguese economy. To use these elasticities we need to 
compute the variations on the following tax bases: private consumption, gross operating 
surplus, compensation of private sector employees and employment. For private con-
sumption,  C, we used the previously mentioned estimation of a linear consumption 
function. For gross operating surplus, S, and for the compensation of private sector em-
ployees, W, we considered that these aggregates changed proportionally with output. 
Finally, for employment, N, we estimated a linear relationship between the logarithm of 
employment and the logarithm of output allowing us to estimate the elasticity of em-  20
ployment with respect to output as 0.279. After obtaining the changes on the bases, we 
applied directly the expressions for the tax revenue changes presented in Neves and 
Sarmento (2001). The expressions are as follows: 
() ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1.69 1.69 0.69 =− + = − H TW N N W ˆ N     ˆ ˆ 1.1 = I TC
{ } { } 11 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ min , max ,0 Ct t t t t TS S S S −− =+ − 2 −   ˆˆ = SS TW    . 
where   stands for the rate of growth of variable x, the T’s are the central government’s 
tax revenues identified in the legend of Table 1 and the subscript t refers to time period 





H T  to allow for tax progressivity. As we want to be conservative about the 
expansion of public revenues induced by the project and we had no access to sound and 
reliable data on employment, we preferred to assume no progressivity effect on the 
households’ direct taxes; this implied TW ˆˆ
H = . 
  The table below presents the final values obtained for the four revenue catego-
ries in each year. The progressivity effect on households’ direct taxes was ignored in 
these calculations. The 2001 present value of all these revenues is €1,531.2m. 
Table 4—Central tax dividends from the master developer’s expenditure 
  Million euros, 2001 prices, undiscounted values 
  H dT I dT C dT SS dT Total 
1993  2.65 7.70 0.00 5.44 15.79 
1994  17.76 55.11 1.75 36.63 111.26 
1995  15.74 50.15 13.90 34.08 113.87 
1996  25.85 82.30 9.99 55.31 173.45 
1997  39.13 125.20 24.15 87.44 275.92 
1998  58.93 198.63 36.12 131.36 425.04 
1999  18.36 63.11 26.34 40.20 148.01 
2000  10.11 32.46 7.17 23.77 73.52 
2001  8.16 25.84 4.97 19.28 58.24 
Total 196.67 640.50 124.40 433.52 1,395.09 
  Applying the same methodology to the forecasted private construction (a tempo-
rary increase on autonomous expenditure also ascribable to the project), we obtained a 
total of €556.7m. 
  The Expo’98 World Exhibition was the flag event associated to the major urban 
renewal project. We also considered that Expo’98 could increase tourism—Basílio 
(2002). He shows a statistically significant effect, although only temporary, on the net 
inflow of tourists to the Portuguese economy. This may also be seen as an increase on 
autonomous expenditure and so implies an increase on total output. We applied again 
the steps described above and obtained a total of €344.3m for central tax dividends in-
duced by additional tourists.   21
  Summing up the effects of the increase on expenditure due to the master devel-
oper, private firms and additional tourists, the present value of the central government 
tax dividends is €2,432.2m, at 2001 prices. 
  Taken together, the public revenue effects springing from asset appreciation and 
expenditure inflows (€4,026.9m) are much higher than the public subsidy given to the 
project—Exhibition plus urban renewal. As the approach was very conservative and as 
there were several effects not quantified (for instance, the capital gains on local and cen-
tral government property), the study confirmed the net social gain derived from the pub-
lic endorsement of the Expo’98 project. 
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1 These references are application examples. They focus on the macroeconomic impact of EU’s regional 
policy. 
2 Also focusing on EU’s regional policy. 
3 This is certainly the case of Boston’s Convention & Exhibition Centre (http://www.mccahome.com/ 
MCCAHome.aspx). Special taxi medallions were sold to capture this benefit. 
4 The applied analyst may wish to consider another property assessment method if she has access to a 
better one. 
5 In general, the true market prices (either rents or ownership values) are unobservable and those data-
bases just record proxies for such prices. For instance, CCIAAR (2001) reports professional value as-
sessments for Rome city and province whereas Confidencial Imobiliário (2000) reports ask quotes (for 
values) for many Portuguese cities recorded by real estate agents. 
6 State legislation enabled the imposition of the following excise taxes: 10-dollar levy on each vehicular 
rental transaction and an additional hotel room tax—actually, an increase up to 4.5 per cent of the original 
tax rate. 
7 Indeed, w and   can be vectors of tax rates and base subtotals, respectively, depending on the actual 
tax structure. 
8 See Subsection 5.1 for permanent effects and Subsection 6.1 for temporary effects. 
9 To be fully coherent, the impact on social security revenue should also deduct the impact on future so-
cial security payments in countries where earmarking applies. This is more likely the case of fully-funded 
pension systems and definitely not the case of pay-as-you-go systems. Hence, the applied analyst may 
wish to evaluate the project’s impact on net social insurance revenues whenever she has access to studies 
allowing for an easy and sound projection of the future welfare costs out of a projected current revenue 
increase. 
10 See the discussion and the references in Fisher (1996) and Bahl and Linn (1992). 
11 For very large economies the appropriate dimension may be the region. 
12 In our application to the Portuguese case (Section 7 below) we draw on the detailed presentation of all 
the relevant results by Neves and Sarmento (2001). Detailed studies for other EU countries are also avail-
able. 
13 Bouthevillain et al. (2001, p. 41) present a comparison between their results and the OECD’s for the 
common set of countries. 
14 As we were making an ex-ante analysis with access to data extending beyond the credibility acquisi-
tion, we confirmed that the rental rates in those districts actually converged to the benchmark values. This 
convergence was clear by 1998, at a time when the commitment of the Portuguese government and the 
financial sector with the Expo’98 urban renewal project was already guaranteed. 
15 The choice of a small period for estimation minimizes the risk of structural breaks. Indeed, we obtained 
statistically significant structural breaks with longer time series. 